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Senat: Asylum Makeover

THE ASYLUM MAKEOVER: CHEVRON DEFERENCE, THE
SELF-REFERRAL AND REVIEW AUTHORITY
Jessica Senat*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Historically, judicial deference under administrative law was a
much-needed solution; it filled a void by providing specialized areas
where the court lacked expertise. Administrative agencies in the
Executive Branch carry legal expertise in a specialized area, and courts
will defer to the agency’s interpretation of law as long as it does not
generally impede on constitutional rights and does not result in
arbitrary application of law.1 Judicial deference is known to be
applicable in many areas of law, such as environmental and industrial
law.2 The landmark case, Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council,3 produced the Chevron test which requires courts to
defer to an agency’s interpretation of law, absent congressional
interpretation on the statute in question.4 Courts termed it “Chevron
deference” when they defer to agency interpretation of law where
congressional interpretation is lacking.
Under immigration law, courts have applied the Chevron test
to determine the interpretation of the Particular Social Group (“PSG”)
requirement under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); the federal statute
grants asylum to persecuted refugees.5 The statute states, in relevant
part, that an “applicant must establish that race, religion, nationality,
* Jessica Senat, Law Student at Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, class of 2020.
Received a Bachelor of Arts in English Literature from Fordham University at Lincoln Center.
1 J. Lyn Entrikin Goering, Tailoring Deference to Variety with A Wink and A Nod to
Chevron: The Roberts Court and the Amorphous Doctrine of Judicial Review of Agency
Interpretations of Law, 36 J. LEGIS. 18, 26 (2010); The Honorable Antonin Scalia, Judicial
Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 38 DUKE L.J. 511 (1989).
2 Goering, supra note 1, at 38.
3 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
4 Id. at 842-43.
5 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2018).

867

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2019

1

Touro Law Review, Vol. 35, No. 2 [2019], Art. 11

868

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 35

membership in a particular social group, or political opinion was or
will be at least one central reason for persecuting the applicant” when
seeking asylum protection.6 The Board of Immigration Appeal
(“BIA”)7 held that in order to satisfy the PSG standard, the group must
be based on (1) an immutable (shared) characteristic, (2) be socially
visible; and (3) particularly defined.8 Circuit courts disagree on
whether the BIA’s interpretation of the PSG merits Chevron
deference.9 But a broader issue is whether Chevron deference should
be used in immigration law at all. Although Chevron deference was
implemented to solve interpretation issues, it poses the risk of
uprooting basic constitutional rights of refugee applicants in today’s
immigration reform efforts.
One major issue that results from the use of Chevron deference
in immigration law is the threat of political and judicial biases to
immigration reform. It is well known that all politicians hold personal
biases. But these biases deserve more scrutiny when they threaten
basic constitutional freedoms. Former Attorney General Jeff Sessions
amplified this threat in the Matter of A-B-.10 By using a rare referral

6 Id. (“To establish that the applicant is a refugee within the meaning of such section, the
applicant must establish that race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion was or will be at least one central reason for persecuting the
applicant.”).
7 The BIA is the highest administrative court in the Executive Office for Immigration
Review or “EOIR.” The EOIR is an administrative agency under the Executive branch. It is
authorized to adjudicate immigration cases under the authority of the Attorney General. The
BIA has 21 Board Members. Its job is to “resolve the questions before it in a manner that is
timely, impartial, and consistent” as well as “provide clear and uniform guidance to the
service, the immigration judges, and the general public on the proper interpretation and
administration of the Act and its implementing regulations.” 8 C.F.R. §1003.1(d)(1) (2018).
The BIA rarely holds courtroom proceedings, but only reviews and decides appeals by “paper
review” of cases. Applicants may appeal to the BIA after receiving decisions from
immigration judges and directors of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). BIA
decisions are binding on all DHS officers and immigration judges unless they are modified or
overruled by the Attorney General or a federal court. Board of Immigration Appeals, U.S.
DEP’T JUST. https://www.justice.gov/eoir/board-of-immigration-appeals (last updated Oct. 15,
2018).
8 Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 582-83 (B.I.A. 2008).
9 Benitez Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that being a former gang
member is recognized as a particular social group); Martinez v. Holder, 740 F.3d 902 (4th Cir.
2014), as revised (Jan. 27, 2014) (same); Arteaga v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 2007)
(holding that former/current gang membership does not constitute a particular social group for
the purposes of the asylum statute); Gonzalez v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 820 F.3d 399 (11th Cir. 2016)
(same).
10 Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018).
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and review mechanism to refer the case to himself,11 Sessions reversed
Matter of A-R-C-G-, a decision that allowed women fleeing domestic
violence to apply for asylum.12 In the opinion, he dismissed domestic
and gang violence as a claim that is “unlikely to satisfy the statutory
grounds for proving group persecution that the government is unable
or unwilling to address.”13 Sessions did not implement new standards
of law, but denounced the BIA’s failure to properly follow precedent
in deciding Matter of A-R-C-G-.14 This conclusion is questionable
because the decision itself is overshadowed by outdated views on
gender violence, and inflated legal requirements that cause more
confusion than clarity.15
In addition, the Chevron test promotes growth of judicial
biases, which threatens any chances left for refugees to seek
protections in the United States. In a George Washington Law Review
article, Chevron Bias,16 Philip Hamburger puts the values of Chevron
deference against the long-standing values of the U.S. Constitution.17
Hamburger argued that deference to agency interpretation produces
“systematic biases”; the doctrine violates the Fifth Amendment right
to due process because the Chevron test requires judges, absent
congressional interpretational basis, to defer to the government’s
interpretation of an issue.18 This problem is even more prominent in
cases where the government is a party.19 The BIA is the perfect stage
for these biases to work against refugee applicants, especially in the
case of asylum protections.
This Note argues that judicial deference adversely impacts
asylum applicants. Allowing flexibility in interpretation of important
immigration laws causes confusion and distances U.S. immigration
law from its initial purposes. Further, Jeff Sessions’ work as a senator,
and later as U.S. Attorney General, amplified divisiveness, prejudice

11 The provision states in relevant part “[t]he Board shall refer to the Attorney General for
review of its decision all cases that: (i) The Attorney General directs the Board to refer to
him.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1).
12 Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 390 (B.I.A. 2014).
13 Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 320.
14 Id. at 333.
15
Id.
16 Philip Hamburger, Chevron Bias, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1187, 1187 (2016) (discussing
systematic biases).
17 Id. at 1191-92.
18 Id. at 1212.
19 Id.
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and unfounded fear of the “other.” The self-referral provision should
be amended to prevent abuse of the provision by the Attorney General.
This Note addresses the legislative history of the asylum statute
in Part II.20 The 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees was the foundation for asylum law in the United
States.21 Part III discusses the PSG requirement and the resulting
circuit split over its interpretation. Part IV briefly highlights the
history of administrative law, and discusses the political,
constitutional, and judicial ramifications of Chevron deference in
modern day immigration reform.
Part V evaluates Jeff Sessions’ work under the Trump
Administration and how constitutional rights have been disregarded
for personal agendas. Part VI analyzes how the self-referral
mechanism disrupts the immigration process and contravenes
constitutional principles. Finally, Part VII looks at how Congress and
the judiciary may regain some ground. Although deference is a
necessary tool in ensuring that principles are applied in a fair and
knowledgeable manner, for the sake of ensuring that constitutional
right to due process remains intact, there should be a limit to when
courts defer to an agency’s interpretation of the law. Where there is a
threat to foundational principles and a call to answer basic human
needs, the courts should take a closer look instead of deferring to
agencies’ standards.
II.

OVERVIEW OF U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW

The history of refugee laws in the United States errs more on
the side of exclusivity than inclusivity.22 Discriminatory policies were
prevalent: an example of this is the Emergency Quota Acts of 1921
and 1924.23 Congress designed a quota system that limited the number
of minorities entering the United States and made the process easier
for Northern and Western Europeans.24
Remnants of this
20 Kathryn M. Bockley, A Historical Overview of Refugee Legislation: The Deception of
Foreign Policy in the Land of Promise, 21 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 253 (1995).
21 Id. at 278.
22 Id.
23 Bockley, supra note 20, at 259.
24 Id. (“The Quota Act set forth percentages of immigrants eligible for admission from both
northern and southeastern Europe based on percentages derived from the U.S. Census Bureau.
However, immigration from the western European countries remained unrestricted. . . . [T]he
Quota Act has been widely criticized for elevating the issues of race, ethnic prejudice and
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discrimination remained when Congress enacted the Immigration and
Nationality Act (“INA”) in 1955, even after the quota system was
eliminated under the amendments to the INA laws.25
In 1967, the United States began to take steps to eliminate
discriminatory refugee policies.26 Today’s immigration and refugee
laws are based on the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees or “Refugee Convention.”27 The Refugee
Convention was a response to the refugee crisis left in the wake of
World War II. It defined its purpose to protect any “person who faces
serious human rights abuses where a state has failed in its fundamental
obligation of protection for reasons of the person’s status or beliefs,
resulting in fundamental marginalization and an inability of the person
to vindicate his or her rights in his or her home country.”28 Under the
Convention, an applicant only needed to show that he or she has a
“well-founded fear” of persecution.29
Congress incorporated these provisions of the Refugee
Convention when it signed the United Nations Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees (“Protocol of 1967”).30 However, it was not until
the Refugee Act of 1980 when the United States removed geographical
or ideological biases and expanded the definition of refugee to include
all persons regardless of ethnicity or nationality.31 Congress created
the Refugee Act to bring the United States immigration laws in line
with the United Nations Protocol.32 In addition, the Refugee Act
assimilation above any concerns for human suffering or the desperate situation of particular
refugees.”).
25 Refugee Timeline: Immigration and Naturalization Service Refugee Law and Policy
Timeline, 1891-2003, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERV., https://www.uscis.gov/history-andgenealogy/our-history/refugee-timeline (last updated Feb. 20, 2018) (discussing that the INA
removed the quota system but still included preferences that favored immigrants from western
Europe).
26 Id.
27 DEBORAH E. ANKER, THE LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES § 1:2, Westlaw
(database updated April 2018) (explaining that in the United States, there are three major forms
of protections for refugees: asylum, withholding of removal, and convention against torture).
28 Id.; see also Bockley, supra note 20, at 278.
29 Bockley, supra note 20, at 278.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 281; Refugee Timeline, supra note 25.
32 Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96, 106 (D.D.C. 2018) (“The Board of Immigration
Appeals (‘BIA’), has also recognized that Congress’ intent in enacting the Refugee Act was
to align domestic refugee law with the United States’ obligations under the Protocol, to give
statutory meaning to ‘our national commitment to human rights and humanitarian concerns,’
and ‘to afford a generous standard for protection in cases of doubt.’” (citing In re S-P-, 21 I.
& N. Dec. 486, 492 (B.I.A. 1998))).
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included the new PSG standard.33 Under this standard, an applicant is
required to prove that he or she is fleeing persecution on the basis of
being a member of a social group.34 Although this standard established
the requirement for proving persecution, the Act failed to clearly
define the phrase “persecution on the basis of being a member of a
social group.” As a result, the PSG requirement was left to the BIA
for interpretation and clarification.
III.

THE PSG STANDARD35

Many disagree on how to interpret the PSG requirement. In
1987, the BIA sought to provide clarification of this term in Matter of
Acosta and stated that
we interpret the phrase “persecution on account of
membership in a particular social group” to mean
persecution that is directed toward an individual who is
a member of a group of persons all of whom share a
common, immutable characteristic. The shared
characteristic might be an innate one such as sex, color,
or kinship ties, or in some circumstances it might be a
shared past experience such as former military
leadership or land ownership. The particular kind of
group characteristic that will qualify under this
construction remains to be determined on a case-bycase basis.36
The BIA relied on the doctrine of “ejusdem generis” or “of the same
kind” in establishing the PSG definition. It defined the PSG
requirement in relation to the other categories listed in the statute: the
particular social group must be a distinct persecuted group based on
race, politics, religion, sex and nationality.37 Furthermore, the BIA

33

ANKER, supra note 27.
Melissa J. Hernandez Pimentel, The Invisible Refugee: Examining the Board of
Immigration Appeals’ “Social Visibility” Doctrine, 76 MO. L. REV. 575, 596 (2010).
35 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2018) (“To establish that the applicant is a refugee within
the meaning of such section, the applicant must establish that race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion was or will be at least one central
reason for persecuting the applicant.”).
36 Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985) (emphasis added).
37 Id.
34
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stated that the “shared characteristic” is found in the fact that it cannot
be changed.38
In 2008, the BIA established additional requirements for
satisfying the PSG standard.39 In the Matter of S-E-G-, the BIA stated
that in order to satisfy the PSG standard, the group must be based on
(1) an immutable [shared] characteristic, (2) be socially visible; and
(3) particularly defined.40 The BIA stated that “[t]he essence of the
‘particularity’ requirement . . . is whether the proposed group can
accurately be described in a manner sufficiently distinct that the group
would be recognized, in the society in question, as a discrete class of
persons.”41 In Matter of M-E-V-G-, the BIA further defined
particularity as having “definable boundaries”; it must be defined
specifically and not be “amorphous, overbroad, diffuse or
subjective.”42 The “social visibility” element is satisfied if the society
in question perceives the group as socially distinct.43 Another
requirement for the PSG standard is nexus,44 which is established when
the applicant shows that “his membership in a particular social group
was or will be a central reason for his persecution.”45 The BIA stated
that the persecutor’s views and motives are important in establishing
nexus.46
The BIA claimed the PSG elements “may overlap in
application, but each serves a separate purpose.”47 Although the BIA
acknowledges that the “social distinction” and “particularity”
requirements overlap, the court explaines that each requirement
“emphasize[s] a different aspect of a particular social group.”48

38

Id.
Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579 (B.I.A. 2008); Matter of E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec.
591 (B.I.A. 2008) (in both cases, respondents were fleeing gang violence. The BIA reviewed
the eligibility of persons who applied for asylum on the basis of being a member of a gang.).
40 Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 582-83.
41 Id. at 584.
42 Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 240 (B.I.A. 2014).
43 Id. at 241.
44 Id. at 242.
45 Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 223 (B.I.A. 2014).
46 Id. (“[T]he persecutor’s views play a greater role in determining whether persecution is
inflicted on account of the victim’s membership in a particular social group.”).
47 Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 241 (“They overlap because the overall definition
is applied in the fact-specific context of an applicant’s claim for relief.”).
48 Id. The BIA further explained that “[s]ocietal considerations have a significant impact
on whether a proposed group describes a collection of people with appropriately defined
boundaries and is sufficiently ‘particular.’ Similarly, societal considerations influence
39
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However, the BIA’s interpretation creates a very narrow standard for
applicants, increases the difficulty in providing proof, and confuses the
requirements with overlapping definitional terms. In “Rejecting the
Children of Violence: Why U.S. Asylum Law Should Return to the
Acosta Definition of ‘A Particular Social Group,’” Rachel Gonzalez
Settlage noted the difficulty in proving the social distinction and the
particularity requirements. Settlage stated “[p]articularity . . . suggests
hard limits and requires specificity of definition. A group cannot be
too broad or too diffuse. However, if a proposed social group has been
defined with sufficient particularity, then it would likely be too narrow
to meet the requirement of social distinction.”49 In other words, if the
applicant provides evidence proving that the society in question uses
specific parameters to define the social group, rendering them “socially
distinct,” these parameters may not satisfy the particularity
requirement if the BIA finds that it is too “broad” or “amorphous.”50
Although Settlage discusses this difficulty for applicants that are
fleeing gang violence,51 the standards can frustrate applicants from
various backgrounds.
IV.

ADMINISTRATIVE DEFERENCE AND THE CHEVRON TEST

Judicial deference grew from the “respect for the specialized
expertise” government agencies held in addressing social and
economic policy.52 Under the immigration law, many courts today
cite Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council as the
primary guide in determining when judicial deference is applicable to
an agency’s interpretation of law.53 However, the Chevron Court
failed to explicitly acknowledge the Administrative Procedure Act of
1946 as a foundational guideline.54
whether the people of a given society would perceive a proposed group as sufficiently separate
or distinct to meet the ‘societal distinction’ test.” Id.
49 Rachel Gonzalez Settlage, Rejecting the Children of Violence: Why U.S. Asylum Law
Should Return to the Acosta Definition of “A Particular Social Group,” 30 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
287, 310 (2016).
50 Id.; see also NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUST. CTR., PRACTICE ADVISORY: APPLYING FOR ASYLUM
AFTER MATTER OF A-B- (Jan. 2019), https://immigrantjustice.org/sites/default/files/contenttype/page/documents/2019-01/Matter%20of%20A-B-%20Practice%20Advisory%20-%201.
2019%20Update%20-%20Final.pdf.
51 Settlage, supra note 49, at 328.
52 Goering, supra note 1, at 26.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 34.
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Judicial Review Under the Administrative
Procedure Act of 1946

The Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) provides
guidelines for administrative adjudication, hearings, rulemaking, and
decisions.55 Also, the APA provides standards for judicial review of
agency action.56 Under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), in order to set aside an
agency’s action, courts must conclude that the regulation is “arbitrary
and capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance
with the law.”57
The APA’s goal is to strengthen the administrative process by
providing limitations on the scope of judicial review.58 In Tailoring
Deference to Variety with A Wink and A Nod to Chevron: The Roberts
Court and the Amorphous Doctrine of Judicial Review of Agency
Interpretations of Law, J. Lyn Entrikin Goering observes that although
the APA authorizes a broad range of judicial scrutiny, many courts fail
to reference the APA or even take advantage of its full authority in
reviewing agency actions.59 However, there is no mention of the APA
guidelines in Chevron or any reference to the APA as the initial
foundation for the Chevron test itself.60
B.

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.

In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., the Supreme Court held that judicial deference to an agency’s
construction of a statute is warranted where the intent of Congress for
that statute is unclear.61 In Chevron, respondents National Resources
55

Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946).
Id.
57 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2018).
58 Goering, supra note 1, at 33.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 26. In the recent D.C. District Court decision Grace v. Whitaker, the Court applied
both the APA § 706(2)(A) “arbitrary and capricious” standard and the Chevron balancing test.
It pointed out that both doctrines overlap: “Although [this] review is deferential, ‘courts retain
a role, and an important one, in ensuring that agencies have engaged in reasoned decision
making.’” Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96, 122 (D.D.C. 2018) (citing Judulang v.
Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 52 n.7 (2011)).
61 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)
(holding that “[i]f the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as
well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If,
however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at
56
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Defense Council, Inc., Citizens for a Better Environment, Inc., and
North Western Ohio Lunch Association, Inc., challenged regulations
announced by the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”).62
Specifically, respondents challenged the EPA’s construction of the
“stationary source” in the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments.63 The
Court of Appeals held for the respondents and set the regulations
aside.64 The Supreme Court held that the D.C. Circuit’s judgment
resulted in error partly because it developed its own judicial definition
of a term that lacked any congressional interpretation.65 Under the
Chevron test, the first step is to first determine whether the statutory
language addresses the main question at issue.66 If it does not, the court
must determine whether Congress addressed the ambiguous provision
in question.67 According to the APA, if the statute includes an
undefined term, its interpretation is considered to be a question of law
and is generally within the court’s jurisdiction to apply traditional
statutory interpretation.68
If traditional statutory interpretation
resolves the ambiguity, the court may apply its own interpretation,
even if it differs from the agency’s interpretation.69 Under Chevron, if
the statute includes an undefined term, and Congress did not address
the ambiguity, the Court is required to determine whether Congress
delegated the authority to the agency to provide interpretation of the
specific provision.70 If “there is an express delegation of authority to
the agency” to provide interpretation,71 the court will then review

issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute. . . . [T]he question
for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute.”); see also I.N.S. v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415 (1999).
62 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 841 n.3.
63 Id. Under the 1977 amendments, industrialized states that failed to adopt the EPA’s 1970
amended air quality standards were required to establish permit programs for new stationary
sources. The EPA defines “stationary sources” as “any building, structure, facility, or
installation which emits or may emit any air pollutant.” Id. at 846. The 1977 amendments did
not expressly reference “bubble concept” or contain the definition of the term “stationary
sources.” Id. at 851. However, the EPA adopted an additional “plant wide” definition of
stationary sources that allowed companies to exempt existing structures from complying with
the permit requirement as long as the total amount of emissions did not increase. Id. at. 854.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 842.
66
Goering, supra note 1, at 43.
67 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
68 Goering, supra note 1, at 43.
69 Id.
70 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
71 Id. at 843.
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“whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction
of the statute.”72
The Supreme Court based its explanation on two basic
principles.
The first is acknowledging that Congress needs
administrative agencies to fill in the gap where there is a lack of
expertise knowledge: “The power of administrative agencies to
administer a congressionally created . . . program necessarily requires
the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left,
implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.”73 This “formulation of policy”
includes technical as well as substantial knowledge. The second
principle is acknowledging that Congress has expressly authorized the
agencies to create the policies: “If Congress has explicitly left a gap
for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the
agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation.
Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they
are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”74
C.

The Circuit Split

Applying the Chevron deference doctrine to the BIA’s
interpretation of the PSG requirement spurred more confusion amongst
the circuit courts. It cannot be denied that the visible social group
interpretation is “largely a very malleable social construct.”75 In
Persecution of Particular Social Groups and the much Bigger
Immigration Picture, R. George Wright stated that “[t]he circuit split
is motivated in part by the availability of more, and less, literal families
of interpretations of the idea of “social visibility.”76 While many courts
have applied the Chevron test and deferred to the BIA’s interpretation

72

Id. at 842-43.
Id. at 843 (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974)).
74 Id. at 843-44 (“We have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to
an executive department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, and
the principle of deference to administrative interpretations has been consistently followed by
this Court whenever decision as to the meaning or reach of a statute has involved reconciling
conflicting policies, and a full understanding of the force of the statutory policy in the given
situation has depended upon more than ordinary knowledge respecting the matters subjected
to agency regulations.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
75 R. George Wright, Persecution of Particular Social Groups and the Much Bigger
Immigration Picture, 62 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 163, 171-72 (2014).
76 Id. at 170-71.
73
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of the PSG requirement,77 a minority of courts refuse to defer to the
BIA’s interpretation.
In Scatambuli v. Holder,78 petitioners sought asylum protection
because they feared persecution as “government informants.”79 The
Immigration Judge and the BIA denied the claim, finding that
government informants were not a particular social group.80
Petitioners argued that the BIA “improperly relied on the ‘social
visibility’” aspect of the test.81 The First Circuit denied this argument,
and found that the petitioners failed to satisfy the PSG requirement
because the group was not well known and thus “not particularly
visible.”82 In Rivera-Barrientos v. Holder, the Tenth Circuit upheld
the social visibility and particularity standards and found the petitioner
failed to satisfy the requirement.83 Petitioner had claimed that she was
persecuted on the basis of her membership in a particular social group:
young females between the ages of 12 and 25 who resisted gang
recruitment.84 The BIA had rejected this as satisfying the PSG
standard, finding that the group was not “defined with particularity” or
“socially visible” enough to constitute a particular social group.85
Petitioner argued that the BIA’s determination was “arbitrary” and a
limitation to the “statutory ‘particular social group’ basis for refugee
status.”86
However, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the BIA’s
determination, stating that “the particularity requirement flows quite
naturally from the language of the statute . . . . [i]t is the BIA’s
responsibility to give meaning to all of the language of the statute,
especially when there is some ambiguity as to its scope and
application.”87 In holding for the government, the Tenth Circuit
The First and Tenth Circuits accepted the “social visibility” and “particularity” standards.
Id. at 171; see also Arteaga v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that
former/current gang membership does not constitute a particular social group for the purposes
of the asylum statute); Gonzalez v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 820 F.3d 399 (11th Cir. 2016) (same).
78 Scatambuli v. Holder, 558 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2009).
79 Id. at 55.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 60. The applicants argued that they were members of the purported group of
“informants” who feared they would be killed if they returned to Brazil.
83 Rivera-Barrientos v. Holder, 666 F.3d 641, 653 (10th Cir. 2012).
84
Id. at 645. Petitioner was harassed, assaulted, and constantly pressured to join the “Mara
Salvatrucha” or the “MS-13” gang in El Salvador. Gang members threatened to kill her family
if she refused.
85 Id. at 648.
86 Id. at 649.
87 Id.
77
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expressed its support for and deference to the BIA’s interpretation of
the PSG requirement.
The Third and Seventh Circuit courts explicitly refused to
apply Chevron deference to the BIA’s interpretation of the particular
social group. The Seventh Circuit addressed the new standards in
Gatimi v. Holder.88 Mr. Gatimi joined a political tribe in Kenya called
Mungiki.89 The group was known for violence, specifically they
performed circumcision on the wives of other members.90 Gatimi
eventually left the group.91 The group then harassed Gatimi and
threatened to kill him if he did not give up his wife to them for
circumcision.92 The group killed his servant and pets and burned down
his property.93 Gatimi constantly asked the Kenyan government for
assistance, but the government was unable to stop the group.94 Both
he and his wife eventually fled Kenya to the United States and applied
for asylum.95 The Seventh Circuit first noted that requiring the PSG to
be socially visible did not make sense under circumstances of
persecution:
Women who have not yet undergone female genital
mutilation in tribes that practice it do not look different
from anyone else. A homosexual in a homophobic
society will pass as heterosexual. If you are a member
of a group that has been targeted for assassination or
torture or some other mode of persecution, you will take
pains to avoid being socially visible; and to the extent
that the members of the target group are successful in
remaining invisible, they will not be “seen” by other
people in the society “as a segment of the population.”96

88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96

Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611 (7th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 613.
Id.
Id. at 614.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 613.
Id. at 614.
Id. at 615.
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The court declined to apply Chevron deference to the BIA’s social
visibility requirement because the BIA proved inconsistent in applying
the new standard.97
In the 2011 case Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney General of
U.S., the Third Circuit addressed the new particularity and social
visibility standards for the PSG requirement.98 Petitioner ValdiviezoGaldamez argued that he had been persecuted on the basis of his
membership in a particular social group and his political opinion, and
had a well-founded fear that this persecution would continue if he
returned to Honduras.99 Valdiviezo-Galdamez had been kidnapped,
beaten, and tortured by members of the MS-13 gang.100 He had called
police for assistance but the police failed to protect him.101 Petitioner
eventually decided to come to the United States to flee the gang.102 The
court evaluated the new standards under the PSG requirement.103 It
recognized that social visibility was not entitled to Chevron deference
because it was inconsistent with the BIA’s prior decisions.104 The
court explained that in previous decisions, the BIA recognized groups
as “‘particular social groups’ where there was no indication that the
group’s members possessed ‘characteristics that were highly visible
and recognizable by others in the country in question’ or possessed
characteristics that were otherwise ‘socially visible’ or
recognizable.”105 The court concluded that social visibility was an
“unreasonable addition” to the PSG requirement.106
Further, the court rejected the government’s assertion that the
particularity requirement was different from the social visibility
element.107
According to the government, the particularity
requirement was an attempt to put boundaries on the size of the PSG,
“When an administrative agency’s decisions are inconsistent, a court cannot pick one of
the inconsistent lines and defer to that one, unless only one is within the scope of the agency’s
discretion to interpret the statutes it enforces or to make policy as Congress’s delegate.”
Gatimi, 578 F.3d at 616 (citing AT & T Inc. v. FCC, 452 F.3d 830, 839 (D.C. Cir. 2006) and
Idaho Power Co. v. FERC, 312 F.3d 454, 461-62 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).
98 Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Atty. Gen. of U.S., 663 F.3d 582 (3d Cir. 2011).
99 Id. at 587.
100 Id. at 586.
101 Id.
102
Id. at 587.
103 Id. at 603.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 604.
107 Id. at 608.
97
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while social visibility helps to determine whether there is an
identifying characteristic that confirms the group in question is set
apart in society.108 The court noted that particularity “appear[s] to be
different articulations of the same concept” and the government’s
attempt to distinguish between the two concepts produced more
confusion than clarity.109
D.

Chevron Deference Should Not Be Applicable to
Immigration Law

The concept of judicial deference is ill-fitted under
immigration law. In the Duke Law Journal article, The Judicial
Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, former Justice
Antonin Scalia provided his perspective on Chevron and the history of
judicial deference.110 As a supporter of the Chevron test, Scalia
admitted that it is not readily clear why a court should accept an
executive agency’s interpretation on a question of law.111 Scalia noted
that the Chevron test implicates traditional judicial authority outlined
in Marbury v. Madison.112
However, Scalia pointed out that one of the “theoretical
justifications” for the Chevron test was the fact that it was not meant
to produce a genuine legislative intent, but was meant to operate
“principally as a background rule of law against which Congress can
legislate.”113 Scalia argued that if that justification is the real intended
function for the test, then there is no reason to require that deference
be consistent with agency interpretations of law.114 Without this
requirement, it makes no sense to hold the agency to a strict standard
of finding the one “correct” meaning of the statute.115 Instead, it is
“free to give the statute whichever of several possible meanings it
thinks most conducive to accomplishment of the statutory purpose.”116

108

Id.
Id.
110 Scalia, supra note 1.
111 Id. at 513.
112 Id.
113
Scalia believed that in most cases subject to deference “Congress neither (1) intended a
single result, nor (2) meant to confer discretion upon the agency, but rather (3) didn’t think
about the matter at all.” Id. at 517.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id.
109
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According to Scalia, this flexibility should be permitted in the
administrative process.
Flexibility in the administrative process cannot work in the
context of immigration law. The BIA has shown inconsistency in the
way it applies its own standards. It is not justifiable to subject millions
of refugee applicants who are seeking protection from violence to
changing standards. This will only result in more inconsistent holdings
and ambiguous language. Regarding the PSG requirement, it will be
difficult for an applicant “to predict whether he or she will qualify as a
refugee and obtain asylum or withholding of removal.”117
Furthermore, the courts’ obligation to adjudicate issues arising
under the Refugee Act of 1980 should trump the Chevron doctrine.118
If courts continue to defer to the BIA’s interpretation of PSG,
immigration law will become bifurcated with BIA’s interpretation on
one side and the foundational principles of the Refugee Convention
and the Refugee Act of 1980 on the other because the two are at odds
with one another. In The Board of Immigration Appeals’ New “Social
Visibility” Test for Determining “Membership of A Particular Social
Group” in Asylum Claims and Its Legal and Policy Implications,
Kristin A. Bresnahan argued that courts are “surprisingly willing to
discount international law governing domestic asylum statutes by
deferring to expansive Executive agency statutory interpretations that
do not conform . . . with limitations created by U.S. international treaty
obligations.”119 Not only does Chevron pose a threat to U.S. integrity
regarding international treaties, but it also threatens domestic
constitutional rights.

117

Hernandez Pimentel, supra note 34.
Kristin A. Bresnahan, The Board of Immigration Appeals’s New “Social Visibility” Test
for Determining “Membership of A Particular Social Group” in Asylum Claims and Its Legal
and Policy Implications, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 649, 663-64 (2011) (“[s]uch ‘reflexive’
deference is not appropriate in the context of asylum law, where Congress’s passage of the
Refugee Act of 1980 clearly and unambiguously stated its desire to conform domestic asylum
law to the United States’ international obligations. As a result, congressional intent is thwarted
when U.S. courts give Chevron deference to BIA decisions that do not conform to the
Protocol’s provisions.”).
119 Id. at 662.
118
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THREAT TO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN JUDICIAL AND
POLITICAL FRAMEWORKS
A.

Unconstitutional Bias

The problem with Chevron deference is the potential risk of
what Philip Hamburger calls “unconstitutional biases.”120 In Chevron
Bias, Hamburger argued that deference allows judges to defer, and
essentially favor, the government’s position on a specific issue.121 This
poses a greater risk in cases where the government is a party in the
case.122 Deference poses a constitutional risk in two ways. First, it
allows judges to distance themselves from the constitutionally
mandated power of judicial review; it permits judges to abandon
“independent judgment” for the sake of deferring to agency
interpretation.123 Article III of the Constitution imposes on a judge the
highest honor of interpreting the law.124 Judges are required to use
independent judgment in reviewing the law, the basics of judicial
review.125 However, the act of deference is “an abandonment of a
judge’s own independent judgment” and an abandonment of the
judiciary itself. This act, he argues, contravenes with Article III of the
Constitution.126
Second, deference violates the Fifth Amendment by
systematically favoring the government’s position on a specific
interpretation of law and as a result, restricting due process. 127 The
problem with Chevron is that judges defer to interpretations made by
the government agencies even if the government is a party to the
action. Hamburger states

120

Hamburger, supra note 16, at 1211.
Id. at 1212.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 1209.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 1206.
126 Id. at 1209 (“Nonetheless, in administrative cases, although judges do not defer to the
judgments of prosecutors, of employers, or of corporations, they regularly defer to the
judgments of executive and other administrative agencies. The judges thereby abandon their
very office as judges. A judge’s central office or duty, and therefore his power and very
identity under Article III, is to exercise his own independent judgment in cases in accord with
the law. He therefore cannot defer to executive or other administrative judgments about what
the law is, but can defer only to the law.”).
127 Id. at 1211.
121
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under the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of due process,
they [judges] at the very least are barred from engaging
in systematic bias. Nonetheless, when they defer to
administrative interpretation, they systematically favor
executive and other governmental interpretations over
the interpretations of other parties. They thus
systematically exert bias toward the government and
against other parties, in violation of the Fifth
Amendment.128
In light of this, it is not hard to imagine the challenges these
threats pose in the context of refugee cases presented to administrative
judges and the BIA. Asylum applicants already face challenges in
facing immigration judges without representation.129 Pro se applicants
who may not be able to afford an attorney face a new and intimidating
legal system, unfamiliar laws, and minimal to no resources. The idea
that the Chevron deference doctrine affords judges the opportunity to
implicate immigration cases with systematic biases is harrowing. It
only proves that the odds are stacked against refugees before they have
their day in court.
B.

The Political Biases in Immigration Reform

As the highest officer of law enforcement in the country, the
U.S. Attorney General plays an important role in executing our
immigration system based on the immigration laws enacted by
Congress. Some of the responsibilities of the position include
overseeing the appointment of judges to immigration and
administrative cases and determining how the laws should be
interpreted.130 The Attorney General also has broad discretion in
deciding how the government should address the issue of immigrant

128

Id. at 1212.
TRAC IMMIGR., ASYLUM REPRESENTATION RATES HAVE FALLEN AMID RISING DENIAL
RATES (Nov. 28, 2017), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/491/ (demonstrating that the
number of asylum seekers who are unable to obtain representation has risen over the last ten
years and that statistics show that unrepresented cases are denied at a much higher rate than
represented cases).
130 “The Attorney General shall establish such regulations, prescribe such forms of bond,
reports, entries, and other papers, issue such instructions, review such administrative
determinations in immigration proceedings, delegate such authority, and perform such other
acts as the Attorney General determines to be necessary for carrying out this section.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1103(g)(2) (2018).
129
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detention and rights to hearings.131 It is important that the Attorney
General remain impartial and provide a balanced perspective in his
decisions.
As a Republican Chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Subcommittee on Border Security and Immigration, Jeff Sessions
often took an anti-immigration stance on many issues.132 For example,
he was a proponent of restricting legal immigration laws or “high
skilled immigration” in favor of American workers and American
taxpayers.133 As senator, he also voted against the infamous “Gang of
Eight” immigration reform deal in 2013, which proposed legislation
that would simultaneously strengthen borders while creating a clearer
pathway for legal immigration.134 Although the position calls for
impartiality, it is impossible for an Attorney General to be completely
unbiased. The process of appointing the U.S. Attorney General is itself
political: the president nominates and the U.S. Senate confirms the
appointment. In the context of immigration, it is dangerous when the
Attorney General abuses the political process to implement personal
biases.
C.

A Fight Against Crime or a Subtle Promotion of
Xenophobia

As former Attorney General, Sessions took opportunities to
further his anti-immigration agenda. In January 2017, President
Trump signed an Executive Order to withdraw funding for sanctuary
131

Id.
Elizabeth B. Wydra, President, The Constitutional Accountability Center, Opposition
Letter to Jefferson Sessions’ Nomination for Attorney General (Jan. 6, 2017),
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/01.06.17%20CAC%20Letter%20on%20Se
ssions%20for%20AG.pdf (“[A]fter the measure passed in the Senate, Sessions published the
‘Immigration Handbook for the New Republican Majority’ to aid House colleagues in
defeating the House version.”).
133 Sessions wrote an op-ed piece for the Washington Post in 2015, arguing for a “curb on
immigration” to reduce the number of immigrants working in low wage jobs and preserve
these jobs for U.S. workers. Jeff Sessions, America Needs to Curb Immigration Flows, WASH.
POST (Apr. 9, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/slow-the-immigrationwave/2015/
04/09/c6d8e3d4-dd52-11e4-a500-1c5bb1d8ff6a_story.html?utm_term=.c61035744b91.
134 Roll Call Vote 113th Congress – 1st Session, U.S. SENATE (June 11, 2013),
https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=113
&session=1&vote=00147 (voting on border security, economic opportunity, and the
Immigration Modernization Act); see also Liz Halloran, Gang of 8 Champion Plan, Declare
‘Year of Immigration Reform’, NPR (Apr. 18, 2013), https://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpoliti
cs/2013/04/18/177780665/bipartisan-senate-gang-prepares-to-sell-immigration-plan.
132
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cities which refused to comply with the federal crackdown on
immigration.135 In March of 2017, Sessions announced that the
administration would “claw-back” federal funds from sanctuary cities
if the cities continued to “adopt policies designed to frustrate the
enforcement of our immigration laws.”136 He justified this decision on
the grounds that (1) that sanctuary states are violating federal law, and
(2) that crime will increase or go unfettered without limiting sanctuary
policies.137
These efforts to curtail immigration laws do not constitute a
meaningful attempt at keeping our communities’ safe. Michael Hiltzik
explained the misconceptions.138 First, Hiltzik argued that Sessions
mischaracterized the role of sanctuary laws. In the context of
immigration law, sanctuary laws are laws that “limit government
employees, particularly local police officers, from inquiring or
disseminating information about the immigration status of immigrants
whom they encounter.”139 The laws intend to foster collaboration
between local enforcement and communities, rather than a blatant
disregard of federal laws.140 These laws were not intended to be a
shield to keep aliens within the cities and deny federal authority.141
Second, Hiltzik indicated that forcing states to comply with federal law
infringes upon separation of powers and violates the constitutionally
protected state police powers.142 Third, Sessions overstated the
135 U.S. Courts have already declared the order unconstitutional. See City & Cty. of San
Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1235 (9th Cir. 2018).
136 Attorney General Jeff Sessions Delivers Remarks on Sanctuary Jurisdictions, U.S.
DEP’T JUST. (Mar. 27, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-jeff-sessio
ns-delivers-remarks-sanctuary-jurisdictions.
137 Id.
138 Michael Hiltzik, Here’s What Atty. Gen. Sessions Got Wrong About the Law in His
Attack on Sanctuary Cities, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/business/hilt
zik/la-fi-hiltzik-sanctuary-sessions-20170328-story.html.
139 Rose Cuison Villazor, What is a Sanctuary?, 61 SMU L. REV. 133, 148 (2008).
140 “Localities have traditionally adopted these policies for a number of reasons, including
the promotion of the general welfare and safety of all residents in their jurisdictions, including
unauthorized immigrants. Local police departments, for example, have adopted ‘noncooperation’ or ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ policies to further public safety concerns.” Id.
141 “They’re not designed specifically to ‘shield aliens’ from deportation, but rather to create
a working relationship between the police and the communities they serve.” Hiltzik, supra
note 138.
142 The U.S. District Court in California concluded that the order violated the separation of
powers and the President does not have the power to impose conditions of federal funds and,
therefore, cannot delegate the power. Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 531
(N.D. Cal. 2017), reconsideration denied, 267 F. Supp. 3d 1201 (N.D. Cal. 2017), appeal
dismissed as moot sub nom. City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1235 (9th

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol35/iss2/11

20

Senat: Asylum Makeover

2019

ASYLUM MAKEOVER

887

connection between a lack of immigration limitations and crime rates.
A 2016 report proved that crime has fallen since the 1990s.143 Finally,
Sessions exaggerated when he claimed that sanctuary policies violated
Section 1373.144 The law did not require a state to gather information
on an individual’s status.145
On the surface, Sessions’ announcement demonstrated concern
for the safety of American communities. He argued that these states
are hiding immigrants, while letting crime infest the neighborhoods, at
the expense of the community’s safety. However, Sessions was in
danger of implicating the anti-commandeering principal.146 He used
his platform to enact policies that aligned with his extreme views,
something that he failed to do as Chairman of the Immigration
subcommittee in the Senate. In other words, he interjected his own
personal bias in policy making. In the immigration context, this
conduct is dangerous. The Attorney General operates as the leader of
these agencies that regulate and enforce immigration laws. He also
may refer immigration decisions to himself to review.147 The Chevron
doctrine allows courts to defer to the agency’s interpretation of the law.
But a problem arises when the interpretation of the law is inconsistent
with Congress’s intentions.

Cir. 2018). Hiltzik states “Defenders of states and cities point to the 10th Amendment, which
has been widely interpreted as protecting state and local law enforcement agencies from being
“commandeered” by the federal government to enforce federal law—such as immigration law.
That places serious limits on the government’s ability to demand cooperation from localities
for immigration sweeps or even detention of suspected undocumented immigrants.” Hiltzik,
supra note 138.
143 Louis Jacobson, Donald Trump said ‘Crime is rising.’ It’s not (and Hasn’t Been for
Decades), POLITIFACT (June 9, 2016), https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/20
16/jun/09/donald-trump/donald-trump-said-crime-rising-its-not-and-hasnt-b/.
144 The law states in relevant part: “Federal, State, or local government entity or official
may not prohibit, or in any way restrict, any government entity or official from sending to, or
receiving from, the Immigration and Naturalization Service information regarding the
citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual.” 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a)
(2018).
145 See id.
146 City of Chicago v. Sessions, 321 F. Supp. 3d 855, 873 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (holding that the
law violated the Tenth Amendment on its face: “In the end, [Section 1373] robs the local
executive of its autonomy and ties the hands of the local legislature. Such affronts to State
sovereignty are not countenanced by the anticommandeering principle of the Constitution.
Section 1373 is unconstitutional and cannot stand.”).
147 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1) (2018).
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THE REFERRAL PROVISION AND THE EFFECT
A.

Self-Referral Provision

8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1) states in relevant part that “the Board
shall refer to the Attorney General for review of its decision all cases
that (i) the Attorney General directs the Board to refer to him; (ii) [t]he
Chairman or a majority of the Board believes should be referred to the
Attorney General for review.”148 This authority was first established
in regulations issued in 1940149 and has since gone through
amendments.150 Only three actors can use the self-referral: The
Attorney General, the BIA, and the Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security.151 There is no regulations in place to guide the
Attorney General on how to refer the case to himself or herself or how
to review the case.152 Also, notice of self-referral is not required to be
provided to the litigants.153 The Attorney General reviews the case on
a de novo standard.154 The Attorney General’s decision is given
precedential treatment and is binding on government and parties to the
action.
The lack of procedural limitations on the authority poses a
threat to an applicant’s right to due process. In Disruptive Immigration
Power, Professor Bijal Shah evaluated the self-referral provision and
the consequences of its use.155 She argued that the lack of procedural
limits to the referral power allows the Attorney General to prioritize
the agency’s interests such as reaffirming the agency’s role in
immigration policy making and the government’s defense in
immigration litigation.156 These interests favor the government’s
position at the expense of the noncitizen litigant.157
148

Id.
Hon. Alberto R. Gonzales & Patrick Glenn, Advancing Executive Branch Immigration
Policy Through the Attorney General’s Review Authority, 101 IOWA L. REV. 841, 850 (2016)
(citing to 8 C.F.R. § 90.12 (1940)).
150 Id.
151 Id. at 852.
152 Id. at 853.
153 Id.
154
Id. at 856.
155 Bijal Shah, The Attorney General’s Disruptive Immigration Power, 102 IOWA L. REV.
129 (2017).
156 Id. at 135.
157 Id. at 136 (“And yet, to the extent aims furthering the agency’s immigration interests are
achieved and maintained at the expense procedural transparency, due process, and of
149
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Furthermore, the self-referral mechanism is disruptive.158
When the Attorney General self-refers, the action is automatically
stayed pending the review.159 Shah describes this as an interruption of
“the organic development of immigration law by the federal courts”160
and an alteration of longstanding doctrine.161 The self-referral
mechanism permits the Attorney General to review foundational
decisions and overturn longstanding interpretation.162 Sessions’
decision in the Matter of A-B- portrays the disruptive use of the selfreferral mechanism.
B.

The Matter of A-R-C-G- & Matter of A-B-

On June 11, 2018, Sessions vacated Matter of A-B- and
expressly overruled Matter of A-R-C-G-.163 In Matter of A-R-C-G-, the
BIA held that married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave
their relationship is a particular social group within the meaning of the
asylum statute.164 Although Guatemala has laws to prevent domestic
violence, enforcement of those law was “problematic.”165 It was clear
that the government refused to assist respondent; she appealed to the
local police multiple times for protection, and the police refused to
assist her.166 Further, the BIA found evidence supporting the assertion
independent decision-making, exercise of the referral and review power runs counter to
administrative decision-making norms and may even be unconstitutional.”).
158 Id. at 144.
159 Gonzales & Glenn, supra note 149, at 853.
160 Shah, supra note 155, at 144.
161 Id. (“In one example, the Attorney General effectively altered longstanding judicial
doctrine by adopting a minority court’s view. Here, most courts . . . had upheld the BIA’s
decision in Matter of C-Y-Z-, which established that forced sterilization of one spouse is an act
of persecution against the other spouse. The Second Circuit reversed the BIA by holding that
the statute in question did not provide for per se refugee status for the spouses of those who
had undergone involuntary or forced sterilizations and abortions. After the Second Circuit
issued its decision, the Attorney General overruled the BIA in a subsequent case in order to
reaffirm the federal court’s opinion.”).
162 Id. at 146 (“In one circumstance, the BIA twice reversed the immigration judge[’s]
denial of asylum on the grounds that the immigration judge did not meet the standard set out
in statute to prohibit status on the basis of national security. The Attorney General then
reversed the BIA’s decision by creating and applying a new standard that diverged from statute
in order to increase the national security barrier to asylum. Some, but not all federal circuits,
including the Second, Third and Ninth Circuits, have questioned or declined to defer to the
Attorney General’s new standard.”).
163 Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 317 (A.G. 2018).
164 Matter of A-R-C-G-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 388, 390 (B.I.A. 2014).
165 Id. at 394.
166 Id. at 389.
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that married women were subject to sexual offenses such as spousal
rape in Guatemala.167
On March 7, 2018, Jeff Sessions moved to refer to himself the
case Matter of A-B- for review.168 The 2016 BIA case dealt with an El
Salvadorian woman fleeing domestic abuse and found that the women
successfully established the PSG standard, based on the test developed
in Matter of A-R-C-G-.169 Sessions requested parties to submit briefs
answering the issue on “whether being a victim of private criminal
activity constitutes a cognizable ‘particular social group’ for purposes
of an application for asylum or withholding of removal.”170
According to Sessions, the BIA failed to apply the correct
applicable law in Matter of A-R-C-G-.171 Specifically, he argued that
[S]uch applicants must establish membership in a
particular and socially distinct group that exists
independently of the alleged underlying harm,
demonstrate that their persecutors harmed them on
account of their membership in that group rather than
for personal reasons, and establish that the government
protection from such harm . . . is so lacking that their
persecutors’ actions can be attributed to the
government.172
He was critical of the BIA’s decision to accept stipulations from the
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) confirming respondent as
a member of a particular social group.173 Sessions examined the
particular social group standard and held that groups “defined by their
vulnerability to private criminal activity” do not constitute a particular
social group. For these reasons, he concluded, claims for domestic
violence or gang violence would not qualify for asylum.174

167

Id.
Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 317.
169 The decision was unpublished, but counsel released a redacted copy of the court’s
decision. Daniel M. Kowalski, Due Process, Asylum Protections for Women Under Attack:
Matter of A-B- Revealed, LEXISNEXIS LEGAL NEWSROOM (Mar. 13, 2018),
https://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/immigration/b/immigration-law-blog/posts/dueprocess-asylum-protections-for-women-under-attack-matter-of-a-b-revealed.
170 Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 317.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id. at 331.
174 Id. at 335; see also Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96, 108-09 (D.D.C. 2018).
168
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Next, Sessions discussed the persecution requirement.175 He
explained that the persecution must include (1) an intent to target a
belief or characteristic, (2) severe harm, and (3) suffering inflicted by
the government or by persons the government was unable or unwilling
to control.176 A petitioner who suffers from a private actor, he
explained, must show that “the government condoned the private
actions ‘or at least demonstrated a complete helplessness to protect the
victims.’”177
Finally, Sessions discussed the nexus requirement between the
harm inflicted and membership in a particular social group.178 He
explained that where a private actor inflicts violence, being a member
of the social group may not be the “central” reason for the harm.179
According to Sessions, in A-R-C-G-, there was no evidence that
petitioner was attacked because her husband was hostile to her being a
married woman in Guatemala who is unable to leave the
relationship.180
Sessions’ opinion is an example of why judicial deference may
be ill-fitted under the immigration context: deferring to an opinion
such as Matter of A-B-, which only fueled more confusion and put
political and social biases on center stage, harms applicants who may
not know how to satisfy the changing standards.181 In the case where
an applicant is establishing past persecution to prove fear of future
persecution, the petitioner’s alleged social group will inevitably be
defined by the persecution itself.182
VII.

DUE PROCESS AS AN IRREVOCABLE RIGHT

Having evaluated the ways in which judicial deference and the
self-referral mechanism can threaten basic constitutional rights for
noncitizen applicants and risk undoing basic constitutional values in
175

Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 337.
Id.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 338.
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 Courts have held that an applicant is required to only prove fear of future persecution.
In order to do so, the applicant must establish past persecution on account of a protected
ground. However, Sessions compiled the requirements for proving future persecution under
the general umbrella of “persecution.” NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUST. CTR., supra note 50.
182 Id.
176
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the name of favoritism and bias, the author in this Part evaluates ways
in which these doctrines can be used to avoid infringing on a refugee’s
right to due process.
A.

Chevron Deference Deserves More Scrutiny from
The Courts

Under immigration law, the application of Chevron deference
should be consistent with the principles of due process under the U.S.
Constitution. One solution would be to cease deference in immigration
cases. The Chevron doctrine allows courts to defer to an agency’s
interpretation of law, essentially abandoning their own constitutionally
mandated authority to review and interpret the law. In extinguishing
the Chevron doctrine, the rulemaking authority of agencies would be
more defined and less indirect.183
Another solution would be for courts to actually consider the
constitutional ramifications of applying Chevron deference. Courts
should consider whether deference would result in substantial
deprivation of due process in litigation. Perhaps there should be
additional standards applied on a case by case basis to determine
whether the case merits Chevron deference: where a case involves the
government, the court should look to see if the agency has a record of
being unbiased and direct in its application of the law for that specific
issue. In the context of immigration law, judges should not only look
to see if the BIA’s interpretation of the law is consistent with
presumable congressional intent, but should also look to see if the BIA
has applied the law consistently, without bias. This may ensure that
judges do not blindly defer to an agency’s interpretation, but instead
take extra care in making sure that the foundational principle of due
process is upheld. An example of this is the recent District Court
decision Grace v. Whitaker, in which the court expressly overruled
Matter of A-B-.

183 Hamburger, supra note 16, at 1240 (“Many agencies would therefore eventually seek an
expansion of express and specific congressional authorization of rulemaking, and Congress
would probable oblige them. In place of relying on ambiguity to convey power to agencies,
Congress would increase its express and specific statutory authorization, including substantial
statutory detail and clarity about the parameters of the agencies’ rulemaking authority.”).
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Grace v. Whitaker & The Power of Judicial Review
Under APA & Chevron Deference.

In Grace v. Whitaker, asylum applicants brought an action
against the Attorney General arguing that the new credible fear policies
outlined in Matter of A-B- violated the APA and INA.184 The plaintiffs
in the action were twelve adults and children.185 Each plaintiff was
fleeing gang and/or domestic violence from Central America and
seeking asylum in the United States.186 Each applicant was found to
have credible fear of persecution pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(1)(B)(ii).187 However, asylum officers determined that
pursuant to the standards in Matter of A-B-, plaintiffs’ claims resulted
in negative credible fear determinations.188
The court applied both the “arbitrary and capricious” standard
under the APA and Chevron deference doctrine,189 and held that the
credible fear policies in Matter of A-B- violated immigration laws.190
The court reviewed the PSG and persecution standards set forth in
Matter of A-B-.191 Under step one of the Chevron test, the court
determined that the phrase “particular social group” was ambiguous
under 8 U.S.C. § 1158 because Congress did not attach any specific
meaning to it in the Refugee Act of 1980.192 The Court acknowledged
that although the INA does not define “particular social group,”193
Congress intended that the Refugee Act conform to the Protocol of

184 Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96, 122 (D.D.C. 2018). In laying out the legal
foundation, the Court first outlined the asylum regulations: before determining whether an
applicant is a refugee as defined under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A), the applicant must be
subjected to an expedited removal procedure in which petitioners are given a summary
removal process instead of a full hearing before an immigration judge. However, under 8
U.S.C. § §1225(b)(1)(B)(ii), “if an alien indicates either an intention to apply for asylum . . .
or a fear of persecution” the alien must be referred for an interview with a U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration Services asylum officer. The standard for determining whether the alien has
credible fear is a “low screening standard.” If the officer finds that credible fear exists, the
alien is taken out of the expedited removal process and afforded a standard removal hearing
before the immigration judge. Id. at 106-07.
185 Id. at 111.
186 Id.
187 Id.
188
Id. at 112.
189 Id. at 120-122.
190 Id. at 105.
191 Id. at 122.
192 Id.
193 Id. at 123.
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1967.194 The court explained that since Congress accepted the
definition of “refugee,” it accepted the definition of “particular social
group” under the Protocol.195 As a result, “particular social group” at
the time of the act “normally comprises persons of similar background,
habits, or social status.”196
In addition, the court held that Congress had not spoken
directly to the issue of whether gangs and domestic-related violence
satisfies the PSG requirement.197 The court concluded that this issue,
along with the term “particular social group,” was ambiguous under
the first step of Chevron test.198 This allowed the court to proceed to
“step two” of the Chevron test to determine whether Sessions’
interpretation of the PSG standard was “arbitrary and capricious.”199
Sessions’ decision and attempt to exclude gang and domestic related
violence from credible fear determinations were not “adequately
explained nor supported by agency precedent.”200 The court held that
the “general rule against domestic violence and gang-related claims
during credible fear determination is arbitrary and capricious and
violates the immigrations laws.”201 Finally, after going through the
Chevron analysis, the court found that Sessions was not authorized to
recreate a new persecution definition because the term was not
historically an ambiguous term under the statute.202
Whitaker exemplifies how courts should utilize both the APA’s
authorization for judicial review of agency actions and the Chevron
doctrine. The doctrine should not be a mechanism where judicial
courts blindly defer to an agency’s interpretation of statutes. It is true
that the Chevron doctrine is a necessary tool for courts to utilize an
agency’s technical knowledge in specialized area of law. But this does
not mean courts are completely absolved from applying judicial review
of agency actions. This Note does not argue that the BIA should

194

Id. at 124.
Id.
196 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) handbook defines the
terms under the Protocol. The court explained “The UNHCR Handbook states that ‘a
“particular social group” normally comprises persons of similar background, habits, or social
status.’” Id. (citing UNHCR Handbook at Ch. II B(3)(e) ¶ 77).
197
Id.
198 Id.
199 Id. at 125.
200 Id. at 127.
201 Id.
202 Id. at 130.
195
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become obsolete in its role. Nor should the judicial courts review all
immigration cases. The goal of this article is to analyze the dangers of
masquerading personal biases as precedential law and the effects this
has under the current U.S. immigration system. Courts must apply
judicial scrutiny to review agency interpretations of statutes and serve
as a check on administrative adjudicators.
C.

The Self-Referral Mechanism Needs Procedural
Limits

In Disruptive Immigration Power, Professor Bijal Shah
introduces various ways in which the Attorney General may use the
referral mechanism to not infringe on one’s rights to due process.203
One way is to provide more procedural limitation to ensure due process
is given to applicants in litigation. In moving to self-refer a case, the
Attorney General should be required to provide actual notice to the
litigants detailing her intentions on the case and the guidelines in
providing briefs to support opposing positions. In doing so, counsel
will not be blindsided by the Attorney General’s decision. Further,
there should be time limits for the Attorney General to exercise the
self-referral provision. The Attorney General should not be allowed to
overturn precedent that resulted in years of rulings, reverting the status
of many refugees and ultimately causing more disruption than clarity.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Permitting courts to defer to an agency’s interpretation of
important immigration laws causes confusion and distances U.S.
immigration law from its initial purposes. U.S. Circuit courts
providing deference to the BIA’s interpretation of the PSG
requirement has resulted in confusion and division amongst
adjudicators and jurisdictions. Further, Jeff Sessions’ work as a
senator, and later as U.S. Attorney General, exacerbated his
divisiveness, resulting in his overturning decades worth of
203 Shah, supra note 155, at 139 (“One targeted solution would be to prioritize rule of law
values by creating uniform procedural requirements for the exercise of the referral and review
tool. More specifically, these norms could be furthered by implementing standardized
procedural requirements (such as notice, a briefing schedule, a consistent role for noncitizens’
counsel, etc.) for the Attorney General’s exercise of the referral and review mechanism. . . .
[S]uch measures would be more effective if concretized by legislation or regulations, and thus
not subject to discretionary alteration by the Attorney General.”).
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immigration precedents via an often-unused procedural mechanism: a
self-serving decision rooted in political bias and improper
generalizations about immigrants from Central America. As such, the
self-referral provision should be amended to prevent abuse of the
provision by the Attorney General.
The Chevron doctrine and self-referral mechanism contravene
constitutional principles. They hurt asylum applicants by injecting
political biases into the immigration process and allow adjudicators to
discard their duties to interpret the law and apply independent
judgment. It is important to have an efficient immigration system.
However, this should not come at the expense of the rights to due
process for those whose primary goal is to seek a better life and second
chance in the United States.
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